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Jeremy Hunt must consult properly on accountable
care organisations
If ACOs are allowed to operate they can be given multi-billion pound budgets, including those for
GPs and public health
Allyson Pollock professor of public health 1, Peter Roderick principal research associate 2
1Newcastle University, UK; 2Institute of Health and Society, Newcastle University, UK
The Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt, intends to
change secondary legislation to enable US-style accountable
care organisations (ACOs) to operate in England. He has
consulted on technical changes to 12 regulations which would
define ACOs and let them operate under contract. But so far
there has been no public consultation about whether the law and
the NHS should undergo this major change.
ACOs were conceived in the US in an effort to stem rising
healthcare costs caused by fee-for-service payments and
Medicare fraud in a commercial system.1 2 They involve
government and private insurers awarding large contracts to
commercial providers to run and provide services. The evidence
on quality improvement is contested, and at best mixed, while
projected savings to federal budgets translated into a net loss
in 2015 and spending may have increased.3 4
NHS England (NHSE) says that it intends to consult on a
standard model contract for ACOs in 2018. But if Hunt’s
changes are brought in before then, the legal framework would
facilitate ACO contracts to be introduced before the public
consultation. That consultation would then be too late to
influence a major—and deeply worrying—reorganisation of
health services, including what the government refers to as
“dissolution of the boundaries” between health and social care.
If ACOs are allowed to operate they can be given multi-billion
pound health and social care budgets, including those for GPs
and public health, for up to 10, or possibly 15, years.
The rationale for ACOs is the integration of health and social
services, and reduction in the complexity and expense of the
tendering process. That rationale has quietly extended to
“dissolving” the boundaries between health and social care—a
move that could have far reaching implications for the
availability of free health services and which has not been
publicly debated.
ACOs are not recognised in the UK, and there is no proposal
to enact primary legislation, which would have to pass all
parliamentary stages, to introduce them. The proposed changes
to secondary legislation are presented as minor and technical,
but the consultation Hunt has conducted told us next to nothing
about them. They were even defined differently in different
regulations.
Crucially, ACOs will be non-NHS bodies “designated” by
NHSE, even though there is no statutory provision conferring
such a function on NHSE. Behind the ACO it appears that there
will be a network of companies—such as large providers,
subcontractors, insurance companies, and property
companies—but the consultation is silent on ACO membership
or their contractual relations. According to NHSE, ACOs will
be in charge of allocating resources—effectively deciding which
services are provided and to whom; which services are available
free, through insurance, or out-of-pocket payments; and which
services are to be means tested. They can take over patients on
GPs’ lists, and they can subcontract all “their” services.
The consultation failed to address many issues—why, for
example, are ACOs necessary to achieve the stated policy
objectives? No explanation was provided for why the powers
already given by parliament to integrate services are insufficient
to achieve the objectives. The consultation neither set out, nor
called for, evidence on ACOs’ likely effect on outcomes and
inequalities, or on the scope, range, entitlement, and access to
services, which are especially important given the different
funding and population bases for health and social services. The
accountability rules an ACO would be subject to, including
public rights of involvement in its decision making, were barely
mentioned, and the governance and transparency rules not at
all.
Nothing was said about how the ACO would be prevented from
walking away from the contract. The consultation was also silent
on the applicability of freedom of information and human rights
laws, and whether ACOs would be amenable to judicial review.
ACOs are being introduced at a time when the 207 clinical
commissioning groups are increasingly merging and aligning
with the 44 non-statutory Sustainability and Transformation
Partnership “footprints” across England.5 STPs are now forming
as virtual organisations, possibly to replace CCGs, thus making
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it easier to drive through £26bn (€29bn; $34bn) savings and
associated cuts and closures, reducing the need for local public
consultation.
Introducing ACOs is so fundamental that the proper way to do
so would be for the proposals and their justification to be set
out openly and clearly, as in a White Paper, and to invite wide
public and professional responses—including in Scotland and
Wales where the impact of ACOs is entirely unknown. It is of
grave concern that this has not been done to date. It is still open
to Jeremy Hunt to do so.
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